

Introduction to Cryptology


Lecture-11 Public-Key Cryptography ElGamal Public-Key Crypto-System

15.05.2023, v48

Lecture Outlines

- Public-key Objective
- ElGamal Public-Key Encryption System
- ElGamal Public-Key Signature System
- ElGamal Security considerations
- Public Key Signature Standard

The Target of Public Key Cryptography



ElGamal Crypto-System, 1985




Taher ElGamal

Taher ElGamal: BSc, EE from Cairo University, MsC and PhD Stanford University advisor M. Hellmann
ElGamal Cryptosystem became a NIST standard called DSA in 1994.

Basic idea: Multiplication instead of exponentiation

ElGamal Crypto-System 1985

Basic idea: Multiplication instead of exponentiation




The inverse key Z^{-1} should not be computable if Z is known

Is that possible?: Yes,
By using groups arithmetic in in GF !


ElGamal Crypto-System 1985

Basic idea: Multiplication instead of exponentiation for encryption

That is possible by using arithmetic in in GF(q) !




EIGamal Security-System (1985)



Example 1: Setup EIGamal Encryption System using GF(11). Send the message M=10 from user A to B. The secret key of B is 6 and for A is 7

Solution: $p=11 \Rightarrow 2, 5 \neq 1$, Possible orders = divisors of $p-1=2 \times 5$, that is 1, 2, 5, 10.
 Computing order of $\alpha=2$: $2^2=4 \neq 1, 2^5=10 \neq 1, \Rightarrow$ order of 2 is 10 $\Rightarrow 2$ is a primitive element!



EIGamal Crypto-System (1985)

Advantages

- based on discrete logarithm problem
- Security is as that of DH system
- DL problem needs less key-bits than RSA for the same security
- Asymmetric workload: good for some applications
- EIGamal encryption is probabilistic, meaning that a single plaintext would be encrypted to many possible ciphertexts as a new random R is required for each encrypted block..

Disadvantages

- The cryptogram needs more bits than the plaintext (double)
- A new random is needed for every encrypted message
- Asymmetric workload: bad for some applications

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EIGamal Signature Scheme

User A signs M

X_a = Secret Key of A

$\alpha^{X_a} = y_a$

public directory

α is primitive in GF(p)

y_a = public key of A

Verifier

p, α, y_a

M

$k^{-1} \cdot (M - r \cdot X_a) \text{ mod } (p-1) = S$

S

k

$r = \alpha^k$

M

S

r

Signed Message

$\alpha^M = y_a^r \cdot r^S \text{ mod } p$

Then M is authentic.


User A cannot deny having signed message M

k Random unit in Z_{p-1}
 That is: $\text{gcd}(k, p-1) = 1$

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Digital Signature Standard DSS (1994)

Explicit true signature based on EIGamal Signature System (1985)



Digital Signature Algorithm DSA Standardized (1994) Based on EIGamal Signature Scheme

User A signs M

X_a = Secret Key of A

$\alpha^{X_a} = y_a$

public directory

α is element in GF(p) with order q

where q = large prime (160 bits)

(q divides p-1)

y_a = public key of A

Verifier

p, q, α, y_a

M

or H(M)

$k^{-1} \cdot (H(M) + r \cdot X_a) \text{ in GF}(q) = S$

S

k

$R_q [R_q(\alpha^k)] = r$

M

S

r

Signed Message

$R_q [\alpha^{R_q(M \cdot S^{-1})}, y_a^{R_q(r \cdot S^{-1})}] = U$

$r = R_q(U)$

Then M is authentic


k Random unit in GF(q)
 For which $\text{gcd}(k, q) = 1$ is valid
 $k = 1$ to $q-1$ (160 bit)

p is a prime with 512 ... 1024 bits, q divides p-1 with a size of 160 bits,
 - fresh k is required for every message!

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Example 2: 1. Sign the message M=6 by using the Digital Signature Algorithm DSA, Use GF(p)=GF(11).
2. Check the resulting electronic signature

Solution: $p=11 \Rightarrow 2, 5=1$, Possible orders = divisors of $p-1=2 \times 5$, that is 1, 2, 5, 10. Select $q=5$
Computing order of $\alpha=3$: $3^2=9 \neq 1, 3^3=5, 3^4=4, 3^5=1 \Rightarrow$ order of 3 is 5



EIGamal Signature System (1985), DSS (1994)

Advantages

- Computations on Signer site are less complex than verifier site
- Security is based on the discrete logarithm problem which is still seen as computationally infeasible.

Disadvantages

- A new random is required to sign every message
- more computations than RSA are needed
- DSS may be less secure than RSA as the security in $GF(q)$ with the order of about 160 Bits

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Security of EIGamal Public Key Crypto-System (Equivalent to DH system)

Security considerations and known facts:


1. Based on the assumption/claim that the **discrete logarithm** is still not efficiently computable according to the public literature
2. A primitive element α from $GF(p)$ or $GF(2^m)$ is used to make exhaustive search algorithms infeasible. If $y = \alpha^x$, only y and α are known. To break the system, we need to find x . To get x , α is repeatedly multiplied by itself i times when $\alpha^i = y$, then $i = x$.
The order of α (as a primitive element) is $p-1$ in $GF(p)$ or 2^m-1 in $GF(2^m)$. Therefore, p is selected as 1000 to 4000 bits prime or $m > 1000$.
3. **Caution:** There is no evidence that no efficient algorithms can be found to break the system.
4. $p-1$ should have large prime factor to make the discrete logarithm computation infeasible (p is called a strong prime).

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Hash Functions

Hash functions are needed to generate message digest

Iterated Hash Function: generates a digest of the data after being sequentially processed through the so-called Hash function. In general as follows:



Example: SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) proposed as a standard with DSA with $N=160$ bits (exposed to many attacks!) **not more recommended !!!**

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
Few Recommended
“Practical Hash Functions”
 by deploying
“Block Ciphers”

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Hash Functions

Based on block ciphers
 DM Scheme (Davis and Meyer)

Cipher key length = Hash Block length = N




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Hash Functions

Based on block ciphers

LM Scheme (Lai and Massey 1992)


Cipher key length = 2 x Cipher block length N




Traditional Hash Functions

Based on deploying block ciphers (BC)

(well known constellations. See NIST standards)




Block-Cipher based Hash Functions alternatives 1/2



Source: Handbook of Applied Cryptography
by Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. Van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone, CRC Press (October 16, 1996) (available free of charge on the WEB)

Block-Cipher based Hash Functions alternatives 2/2



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